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Law of Outer Space-Summarized
Jeffrey Prevost*
W HY, IN VIEW OF THE ESOTERIC NATURE and pure remoteness and
inaccessibility of outer space, is there a need for a body of law
governing man's behavior in that medium?
anawke ubwr LU UL'a question could nil volumes and is still the sub-
ject of heated controversy. However, I hope that by this paper I can
show that the body of knowledge concerning outer space, and the present
capabilities of exploitation of space actually warrant immediate codifica-
tion of boundaries of permissible extraterrestrial activities. The rate of
change of acquisition of scientific knowledge and technological ability
has increased geometrically since the end of the Dark Ages. From this
it should be evident that, even if we feel that space does not warrant
our legal consideration at this stage of development, the time of prac-
tical exploitation may be so close at hand that a prior formulation of
policy and law concerning the peaceful uses of space is a wise matter
if we wish to avoid the despoilation of a virtually virgin territory. Wit-
ness the chaotic ravaging of the New World in the 16th and 17th cen-
turies as the result of unrestrained "development." Space must be saved
from that fate.
Outer space, together with the sub-surface ocean, is an entirely new
area of man's experience. Until this generation it was merely an object
of conjecture; now we know more about the surface of the moon than
we do about the structure of the earth ten miles below the surface.
Space and the sea have been termed man's "final frontier." This is not
precisely true, in the sense of the frontiers of the "Old West" and the
New World. In those cases the pioneer was merely opening up an un-
used portion of beneficial environment. Space and the sea, however, are
hostile; man must carry his environment with him to function, even to
exist. In man's terms, "space" does not exist; it has no meaning for him
except as an obstacle. It is this consideration which leads Professor
Nocolas Matte to write of space as a "non-entity," something which
defies all our notions of territory, property, and sovereignty, forcing us
to adopt a whole new philosophy of law applicable to such a region.' In
space, Euclidian concepts of geometry do not apply; even time seems to
run amok. In Einsteinian terms, space and time are relative; is our legal
* Second-year student, Hastings College of Law, University of California; American
Field Service Foreign Exchange Scholarship 1963-64 Italy. [Note: This paper was
sent to this Review by, and with the recommendation of, Prof. Ralph A. Newman, of
Hastings, as an article of such interest that it ought to be published. We agree, rare
as it is for this Review to publish an article by a student from another law school.]
I Matte, Aerospace Law, 14 (1969). See also, Mozaroff, Exonerations From Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Activities, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 71 (1968).
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treatment of it to be absolute? How will our law regard the interstellar
traveler who returns to earth younger than his grandson? Such prob-
lems may seem to lie in the realm of fantasy now, but they may happen;
and now is the time to formulate new concepts of thought, the better to
deal with the problems when they do arise.
2
The consensus of most legal authorities who have given the matter
any thought seems to be that we must avoid the application of anthro-
pocentric law to the regions of space. There are two reasons for this.
The first is that space is inherently not man-related, as I have stated. Its
adverse environment does its best to deny the existence of man. An
effort to force man-centered laws on an area which almost defies human
comprehension would only result in frustration.
The second reason is the highly improbable but always possible
chance that we shall sometime in the future encounter extraterrestrial
life. The psychological impact of such a meeting or communication
would be impossible to predict, but a well-formulated policy would at
least guarantee a chance that such a meeting would be successful. This
is the basis of Andrew Haley's "Metalaw." 3
The antithesis of anthropocentric law is natural law. The uncon-
fining philosophy of such a law is exactly what we need for such an
unconfined area as outer space, where we must regard man as only one
part of an over-all scheme of interrelated objects. Our adventures into
space as ambassadors rather than as exploiters can only benefit us in the
long run.
I. Origins of Space Law
This section does not attempt to deal with the question of whether
existing rules of law should be applied to the new field of outer space;
rather, I will attempt to show how the use of space has (or has not)
been affected by existing law. Technological advancement, in the early
days of spaceflight, far outstripped exploration of legal and ethical prob-
lems involved, a situation since partially remedied by adoption of the
Outer Space Treaty. This section, then, is of paramount importance in
the history of the infancy of space exploration.
The prime concerns in the infancy of spaceflight were actual legal
definitions of space and the extent of permissible control which nations
could exercise over that area. Since these are analogous to problems in
international law we shall inspect that body of law to see if its rules
apply to outer space.
The question is, where exactly does "air space" end and "outer
space" begin? According to the Paris Convention of 1919 (which the
2 Barnett, The Universe and Dr. Einstein (1957).
3 Haley, Space Law and Government, 54 (1963); and see, Lipson & Katzenbach, Law
of Outer Space (1961).
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United States did not ratify),4 the Havana Convention of 1928,5 and the
Chicago Convention of 1944,6 which superseded the first two, each na-
tion has "complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above
its territory." 7 Space flight at that time was pure science fiction. Was
the air space, then, really intended to include the entire area above a
nation's land mass? There is some indication that there was no such
intention,8 but since it may be supposed that space flight was never
seriously considered the question is moot.
The concept of national sovereignty, whatever its merits, is one of
the most fundamental precepts of anthropocentric law. Thus, if it should
ever be decided that near space (orbit level) is within the lawful con-
trol of the subjacent nation, then the spacefaring nations have been com-
mitting one of the gravest injuries in international law. Two propositions
militate against such an idea. The first is that outer space is not within
the technical meaning of the term "air," and the second is that the of-
fended nations have given their tacit consent to such overflight.
Air space, as such, is not readily susceptible to accurate measure-
ment.9 Traces of gases have been found to altitudes of 70 miles and
higher; some scientists have proposed that the "atmosphere" actually
extends to a height of 60,000 miles.' The great volume of gas, however,
lies within five miles of the earth's surface. Despite this fact, present-
day aircraft such as the discontinued X-15 have reached heights of 60
miles." Obviously the 1944 concept of airspace is wholly insufficient to
define outer space. International law then had no answer to this ques-
tion at the dawn of spaceflight.
Several proposals were advanced to supply an answer. These in-
clude, inter alia: 1. adoption of the old ad coelum doctrine; 2. defining
the boundary as the altitude at which gravity ceases; 3. defining "air
space" as high as there is any measurable air; 4. extending the boundary
to the altitude of effective ground control; 5. setting it at an altitude
"guaranteeing the security of states"; 6. defining air space "functionally"
(for purposes of navigation); 7. setting the boundary at the "von Kar-
man Line." The danger to be avoided in adopting any standard is set-
4 International Convention For Regulation of Aerial Navigation, 11 L.N.T.S. 173
(1919).
5 Convention on Commercial Aviation, 47 Stat. 1901, T.S. No. 840 (1928).
6 Convention On International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591 (1944).
7 International Convention for Regulation of Aerial Navigation, op. cit. supra n. 4
at 173.
8 Latchford, Bearing of International Air Conventions On the Use of Outer Space,
53 Am. J. Intl. Law, 405 (1959).
9 National Aeronautics And Space Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 749. The term "atmosphere"
is used in place of "air space."
10 Roy, Legal Problems of Space Exploration, Senate Document No. 87, 74 (1961).
11 Schultz, Weapons And Space, Proceedings of the Conference On Space Science
And Space Law, 60 (1963).
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ting an arbitrary and often unworkable definition. For our purposes
only the last four proposals are tenable. The ad coelum doctrine is
fantasy in view of the rotation of the earth and the sheer impossibility
of controlling an infinite space. The second proposal is also unworkable
since technically the gravity of earth never ceases at all. Thirdly, as
pointed out previously, the very inconsistency of measurement of the
atmosphere would make such a boundary useless.
Defining the boundary of air space as the limit of effective ground
control is feasible but virtually worthless.12 This concept corresponds to
the old marine league upon which our modern law of territorial seas is
founded; the league, of course, being the maximum range of the ancient
cannon. The problem is in defining "effective control." The U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. can exercise great control over much of near space, but
even their impotence is shown by the impunity with which "spy-in-the-
sky" satellites operate. Most nations have difficulty exercising even
partial control over the zone in which airplanes operate-the airspace of
accepted international law. Thus, we may conclude that "control" is
presently impossible.
For much the same reason the boundary guaranteeing the security
of states is also unacceptable. 13 Spy satellites violate the "security" of
nations every day. Atomic missiles belie the security of nations at any
altitude. Weapons of mass destruction could even be launched from the
moon, to strike the earth at 25,000 miles per hour.14 It should be clear
that no arbitrary boundary could fully protect any nation.
The "navigable air space" theory is more useful and less arbitrary
but subject to fluctuation and uncertainty with advancements in tech-
nology.15 "Pure" aircraft, as mentioned, can operate at heights above 13
miles. This is well below the limit of the atmosphere and the operable
perigee (low point) of satellites. The development of rocket aircraft
muddies the picture somewhat, though, since these craft are capable of
operation in both the atmosphere and near space. It may well be that
the expense and impracticability of such planes will obviate consider-
ation of their effect on the legal status of air space, but their future
capabilities should not be discounted.
The "von Karman Line" has the virtue of setting a boundary that
is easily determined without being completely arbitrary.6 It divides
12 Cooper, Air Law, a Field of International Thinking, 4 Transport and Communi-
cations Review 3, 4 (1962).
13 Air and Space Law, International Law Assn. Rep. 255 (1960).
14 Pietrasick, The Moon as A Fortress, The San Francisco Chronicle, p. 24 (Feb. 1,
1970).
15 Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, Senate Document No. 87, 3
(1961).
16 Based on the work of Dr. Theodore von Karrnan and presented in a paper at the
University of California in 1957: Aerodynamic Heating-The Temperature Barrier in
Aeronautics.
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air and space into "regimes" and is based on seven considerations of
law and fact: 1. aerodynamic lift effectively disappears; 2. there is no
viable air; 3. the regime of exobiology begins; 4. molecular construc-
tion ends and atoms disassociate; 5. "air" as defined by treaty and many
national statutes no longer exists; 6. the aeronautical regime of the Fed-
eration Aeronautique Internationale (which certifies air records) ends;
7. the Kepler regime of hyperbolic flight has taken over.17 The determi-
nation of all these factors is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is
clear thati tiJc ULOIOf -SI -LCL.OO A~fICIOt±,mtSUf.1. ato
ties is that this list constitutes an amalgamation of most of the primary
definitions of "space." The line varies (just as "sea level" or any other
standard does), but its mean altitude is approximately 275,000 feet, or
about 52 miles.18 With scientific determination of the line's mean alti-
tude the practical limit of air space would be established and legal
differentiations could be set with confidence. Above this line sovereignty
would be a meaningless concept; space would be a free zone, open to
all.
Since the lowest operable perigee of satellites is about 85 miles, it
would appear that the fixing of such a boundary is at best an academic
concern. In most respects this is probably true; but a precise definition
of space, and, consequently, the vehicles that operate in it, is important
in terms of possible torts in space. The Rome Convention of 1952 set
standards of liability for aircraft involved in accidents.1" Are the same
standards to be applied to spacecraft? The complete diversity of oper-
ation and potentials of damage would seem to require, if any, greater
standards of care and more adequate remedies for those who may suffer
prejudice from man's operations in space. As will be discussed below, no
standards have yet been adopted at all.
The second proposition refuting any violation of national sovereignty
by trespass through air space is that the nations have given their tacit
consent to such overflight. This idea is actually more important than
the first in terms of international law because part of the law of nations
is customary law, of which consent is a vital part.
2 0
Custom, or usage, has long been an accepted fact of the development
of international law, corresponding the primitive stages of development
of the law of the tribe, the city-state, the nation. Its main tenet is that
such an overwhelming number of entities-as in this case, nations-
give some sort of consent to an activity that the protests of the few dis-
17 Haley, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 96.
18 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 30. Later scientific measurements have placed this
line at approximately 62 miles.
19 Convention On Damage Caused By Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties On the
Surface, Rome, 1952 (never adopted by the U.S.).
20 Haley, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 56.
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senters may be ignored. The question presented then is whether such
consent has been given to national overflight.
My conclusion is that such consent, although tacit, has been mani-
fested.21 Orbital spaceflight has been a reality for more than a decade,
and the space powers have made no effort to hide the fact of overflight
from the "offended" nations. Indeed, some of those nations seem to take
a perverse pride in such flight. In all those years there has not been one
formal protest to overflight which I have found recorded, or cited in any
reference material, directed toward either spacefaring nation. Although
there is no consensus of authority as to when consent establishes an
international "law" to which all are bound, 22 it seems clear to the writer
that such apparent consent has established a usage which should enforce
the de facto aerospace right-of-way as an international law.
The reader may at this point be debating the usefulness of this
whole discussion, regarding the subject matter as remote and of little
immediate importance. It should be pointed out that this matter is of
utmost concern to the superpowers, sensitive to criticism; since the
normal trajectories of spacecraft upon take-off and reentry include long
stretches of flight well below the von Karman Line,23 often over in-
habited territory, the grave spectre of international incident in case of
accident is raised. The establishment of such consent would go far to
mitigate the repercussions of such an event.
A related question arises as to sovereignty over celestial bodies. As
in the prior discussion, there was no clear policy concerning this prob-
lem in international law prior to adoption of the Outer Space Treaty.
The only doctrine relating to this question was the long outmoded ad
coelum principle. 24 Whatever hope of enrichment this may have raised
in the hearts of greedy rulers, however, was dashed by recognition of
the fact that the earth rotates, carrying the nation right out from under-
neath the dominion of the moon and the planets. Thus, this doctrine was
never seriously considered, and freedom of space remained only to be
confirmed by the Outer Space Treaty.
Although much of the law of the sea is also a part of international
law, I felt it best to consider its contributions to the law of space sep-
arately, since the latter has so often been characterized as a vast
"ocean," where brave "sailors" navigate through hazardous conditions. 25
Such an analogy, if valid, might have been useful in delineating zones
of national sovereignty (comparable to territorial waters), and in formu-
21 Id. at 67.
22 Id. at 59.
23 Christol, The International Law of Outer Space, U. S. Naval War College, New-
port, R.I. (1963).
24 Haley, op. cit. suprm n. 3 at 42.
25 Matte, op. cit. supra n.'1 at 47.
Sept. 1970
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol19/iss3/20
LAW OF OUTER SPACE
lating rules of "navigation," international liability, and so forth.26 Un-
fortunately, the analogy is more romance than science. The sea, as
relates to pertinent law, is a surface of two dimensions; space is a three
dimensional volume within which man operates. Time itself contracts;
gravity ceases. The shortest distance between two points is a curved
line; navigation, as used on earth, is meaningless. 27
The falsity of the analogy is pointed out by the fact that the Inter-
national Court of Justice has recognized the right of nations to exploit
nological capability-boundaries which often exceed territorial waters. 28
However, the consensus of international opinion, if not law, even before
adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, was that space and the objects in it
were not subject to national appropriation in any degree. It would
appear, then, that any attempt to apply the law of the sea to outer space,
while it might not result in bad law, would be so unwarranted as not
to be worth the effort. Most authorities agree that the better course
would be to formulate entirely new principles based on the realities of
space.
H. Development of Specific Space Law
The almost complete lack of concrete law relating specifically to
outer space at the advent of Sputnik I was met with characteristic
silence by the governments of the world. Little need was seen to regu-
late such a remote area at all. The United Nations (perhaps sensing an
appropriate area in which to win power and influence), semi-official
and private organizations, and few individuals, however, saw the need
for new concepts and laws to take effect before the world's interest in
space was adversely affected. With the rapid advance of technology and
consequent recognition of space's potential, the super-powers finally
acknowledged the need and adopted the Outer Space Treaty. I will
attempt to deal with the development of the "law" as it was first pro-
posed by the unofficial organizations and the U.N., and finally as it even-
tually was promulgated with full legal effect by our governmental bodies.
A. Pre-Sputnik Era
Actual spaceflight was anticipated by many outside the realm of
science fiction for some years prior to its actual birth. The technology
was born with the V-1 and V-2 rockets of World War II infamy. If the
large nations had been so inclined, orbiting of a satellite could probably
have been achieved in the late 1940s, instead of a decade later. However,
26 Moon, A Look At Airspace Sovereignty, 29 Jour. of Air Law and Commerce 328,
343 (1963).
27 Barnett, op. cit. supra n. 2.
28 North Sea Continental Shelf, 23 I.C.J. yearbook 100.
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recovery from the War, the Cold War, the Korean War, and general
disinterest all conspired to divert attention from such esoteric experi-
ments and led the great powers to put their resources in weapons of
war rather than devote them to peaceful exploration and practical ex-
ploitation of space.
At the same time the scientists of the world were marshalling their
forces to bring about the International Geophysical Year (IGY), 1937-8,
which was to double man's knowledge about his own world. The inter-
national community of scientists enlisted the aid of their various govern-
ments, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. One small experiment pro-
posed the orbiting of a small earth satellite to measure radiation levels
outside the earth's atmosphere. Despite their wholly innocent intentions,
the scientists were causing the prestige of scientific discovery to become
an expensive political prize. In this way one of the least significant
but most spectacular experiments of the IGY became the focus of a
development which was to change man's very outlook on life in the com-
ing decade.
29
The period prior to 1957, however, saw few proposals for specific
space law outside of a few scientists pleading for guarantees that space
be used for peaceful purposes only, and some "science fiction" warnings
against the possibility of contamination by extraterrestrial organisms,
and the need for safety regulations. The law as it stood in the pre-
Sputnik era, then, was of a type of customary law, one respecting the
free pursuit of scientific inquiry, independent of any national--or inter-
national-interference or control. Thus, as long as the objectives of the
Sputnik and Explorer were scientific, objections to their overflight and
potential danger could be regarded as contrary to the custom of nations.
From this beginning has grown the customary law of space discussed
above. 30
B. Post-Sputnik Era
The immediate period following the launching of the Russian satel-
lite spawned a number of nongovernmental organizations specifically
designed to produce legal norms for space. Probably the most important
was the International Institute of Space Law, an organ of the older
International Aeronautical Federation.31 Founded formally in 1959,32
the Institute has conducted annual colloquia, drawing delegates from a
diversity of nations, spacefaring and otherwise, and devoted exclusively
to the development of viable space law. While it is difficult to gauge
the Institute's actual impact on positive law, it is clear that many of the
29 Haley, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 62.
30 Id. at 67.
31 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 47.
32 Among the more prominent of the founders of the I.I.S.L. was Andrew Haley.
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proposals discussed and adopted by that organization have at least had
an influence on the content of later United Nations resolutions and the
Outer Space Treaty itself. The Institute continues to discuss questions
beyond the limited scope of the Treaty and should exert some consider-
able influence in the future.
The United Nations was not remiss in seizing upon the obviously
international problems posed by the advent of space flight. The ad hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was established in
1958.23 Its work product, while not prodigious, encouraged the establish-
ment of the permanent committee in 1959.34 This latter organization did
not meet again until 1961 because of differences between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. concerning its function.35 Soon after this second meeting,
however, the General Assembly adopted unanimously the first proposal
from the Committee, entitled "International Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space," which was the first formal expression by a gov-
ernmental organization of the principles that "international law, includ-
ing the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space," and that
neither space nor celestial bodies are subject to national appropriation. 6
This basic sentiment was reiterated in several subsequent resolu-
tions emphasizing also the need for peaceful exploration of space. These
resolutions encouraged certain groups, such as the World Meteorology
Organization and the International Telecommunications Union, to ex-
pand research into outer space and explore related legal problems
independently. 37 They also urged the highest consideration of astronauts
and their vehicles, requesting that aid be rendered by any nation should
an astronaut be endangered, either in space or on return to earth, and
that space vehicles be returned to their launching nations upon request.38
Probably the most important resolution in terms of political realities
was the resolution demanding that the spacefaring nations refrain from
placing nuclear weapons or other devices of mass destruction anywhere
in outer space. 39 Although this resolution was actually adopted (on
October 17, 1963) after the signing of the Limited Test-Ban Treaty
(August 5, 1963, in Moscow), its adoption was such an expression of
international sentiment as not to be ignored. Indeed, this resolution was
duly noted in the preamble of the Outer Space Treaty itself, and some of
its phrases were incorporated in the body of that Treaty. Although the
resolution has been criticized as too weak, since it does not conden
33 UNGA Res. 1348 (XIII) (1958).
34 UNGA Res. 1472 (XIV) (1959).
35 Haley, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 318.
36 UNGA Res. 1721 (XVI) (1961).
37 UNGA Res. 1802 (XVII) (1962); UNGA Res. 1963 (XVIII) 1963.
38 UNGA Res. 1962 (XVIII) (1963).
39 UNGA Res. 1884 (XVIII) (1963).
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the construction of such weapons, the fact that presently there are no
bombs in orbit-according to published information-must be attributed
at least in part to this expression of world opinion.
An important question is whether these resolutions can be accorded
the status of binding international law.40 The U.N., of course, has no
power to make legislation binding on its members, but these same na-
tions may bind themselves expressly to such proclamations through
accession to an appropriate treaty. Proposals have been advanced that
the resolutions constitute an instantaneous customary law of space,
comparing the speed with which they have been accepted with the rapid
advances in technology. However, in view of the fact that the resolu-
tions constitute an instantaneous customary law of space, comparing
the speed with which they have been accepted with the rapid advances
in technology. However, in view of the fact that the resolutions were
adopted mainly at the urging of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., most au-
thorities feel that the majority of member states will not regard them
as binding unless they are also party to the Treaty.
The most important matter in terms of binding international law
involves development of space law through the treaty-making powers
of the sovereign nations.41 While it is clear that the wishes of a body
such as the United Nations cannot be simply ignored, it is of course not
difficult to circumvent such proclamations, since there is no police
power to enforce them. The making of a treaty does not per se create
a police power, but such an agreement may be considered binding for at
last two reasons. First, all the parties to the agreement have an express
desire to see that the conditions of the final resolution are followed.
Second, the states parties to treaties want other nations to see that they
honor their commitments; nations, like individuals, desire a good "credit
rating." Treaties, of course, if they deal with a prohibition, may pre-
scribe an enforcement power, such as access to inspect, but by far the
most important aspect of observance of treaties is the good faith of the
signatories themselves.
C. The Limited Test-Ban Treaty
The first important step taken by the sovereign states towards the
peaceful uses of outer space was the Moscow Treaty of August 5, 1963,42
which banned tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under water,
and outer space. This agreement, praised by many and condemned by
many, was the culmination of disarmament talks dating back to 1946,
under the Baruch Plan.43 President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal
40 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 275.
41 Id. at 280.
42 14 U.S. T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433 (1963).
43 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 228.
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of 1955 was a threat to both sovereign absolutism of air space and
military secrecy, and thus never gained the favor of either side of the
division of power.44 The stalemate between arms control (favored by
the U.S.) and complete disarmament-without inspection controls-
(favored by the U.S.S.R.) led finally to adoption of the present treaty,
which prohibits only the testing of such devices in the named areas.
Such tests may be detected by seismography on earth; thus, there is a
measure of control. A nuclear blast could not be hidden in space, of
course, so it would be even easier to detect.- There have been at least
three nuclear explosions in space, but none since promulgation of this
treaty.
D. The Antarctic Treaty46
Negotiated originally by the twelve nations which had collaborated
in the exploration of the Antarctic during the IGY, this agreement,
signed December 1, 1969, declared that the Antarctic continent shall be
used for peaceful purposes only. Military bases and weapons testing are
prohibited; at the same time the greatest possible scientific use and
exploration are encouraged.
Analogies have been drawn from the Antarctic to outer space: both
are cold, inhospitable places incapable of supporting human life.4 7 From
this, the argument runs that space should thus be treated exactly the
same as the Antarctic. This assertion is effectively countered by the
fact that the Antarctic is a finite area subject to control and develop-
ment, whereas space in infinite and uncontrollable. This is important
since under this treaty the signatories' claims to sovereign rights in the
Antarctic were specifically declared to be free from prejudice. (Article
IV.) 48
M. The Outer Space Treaty
The culmination of all the previous treaties, UN resolutions, and
scientific usage of space was the agreement titled in full, "Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Mood and Other Celestial Bodies." 49
It was signed simultaneously in Moscow, London, and Washington on
January 27, 1967, a novel device designed to induce accession by a maxi-
44 Id. at 231.
45 Jenks, Space Law 301 (1965).
46 12 U.S. T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780 (1959).
47 Christol, op. cit. supra n. 23 at 257.
48 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 253.
49 18 U.S. T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 (1967).
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mum number of States immediately. 50 It went into effect on October 10,
1967.
The important feature of the Treaty is that it is a statement of prin-
ciples governing the desirable actions of parties rather than definitive
rules delineating exactly both substantive and procedural law. Through
the use of fairly vague terms it sets a pattern for use and exploration,
rather than regulating them. It incorporates by specific reference the
ideals of the prior U.N. resolutions and declares that international law
shall apply also to outer space. Thus, despite the fact that it does not
represent a material advancement over the principles adopted by the
United Nations, it embodies those concepts in recognized legal form and
binding international law. The Treaty has even been hailed as the first
"Space Charter." 51
The Treaty reiterates the prior-expressed desire of the signatory
nations that space shall be used for peaceful purposes only, for the
benefit of all mankind (Article I). The last phrase was included in
order to induce the maximum number of non-space powers to accede
to the Treaty, since the use is to be "in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development . . ." 52
It declares the "freedom" of outer space, both in access to exploration
and to scientific study. The article further states that the parties "shall
facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such investigation."
Thus, it would appear that it is the duty of the signatories to collaborate
in their space ventures. While the U.S. has provided facilities and
assistance to several other countries, and has freely shared information
with the U.S.S.R., it has never actively shared in the accomplishment
of a space flight with that country, although a number of proposals to
that effect have been made. It would appear that the Treaty has not yet
had the desired effect of depoliticizing space.
Article II expressly declares that outer space, including celestial
bodies, is not subject to appropriation by any means. An important
aspect of this section is that it makes no distinction between space, which
is virtually non-controllable, and celestial bodies, which are clearly sus-
ceptible to at least technical appropriation. In fact, it is clear that such
a division is undesirable, and that space should be treated as an in-
divisible entity.53
The reluctance of the great powers to extend the divisional squab-
bles of the earth beyond that sphere (and thereby extending a costly
arms race) led to the adoption of this article. It is possible that the diffi-
culties of actual appropriation as defined under international law-i.e.,
a permanent occupation accompanied by a "sovereign will of authority"
50 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 289.
51 Id. at 288.
52 Id. at 290.
53 Vallado, The Law of Interplanetary Space (1959).
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and control-also made it easier for the space powers to assent to such
an agreement.5
4
A question is raised by the use of private telecommunications satel-
lites in a "stationary orbit" over a fixed point on earth. This is an
"occupation" which effectively appropriates a large volume of space
within its area. 55 Is this to be regarded as an appropriation within the
meaning of Article II? This point has not been settled, but it would
appear that it will not present much practical difficulty since the Soviets
have iidicated they may be willing to cuoperate with INTELSAT rather
than devise their own East European satellite system.56
Article III declares that activities in space shall be carried on in
accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Na-
tions, in the interest of "peace and security." It puts a primary emphasis
on international cooperation and understanding, demanding that the
parties actively promote these principles. Of course, while the super-
powers have used the occasions of their spaceffights to serve up plati-
tudes of peace and goodwill, it is also clear that they have used them
to gain political influence and prestige, a practice not entirely conducive
to understanding and security. It is doubtful, too, that such cooperation
can come about while scientific accomplishments in space are regarded
as a competition.
One of the most important sections of the Treaty is Article IV, which
states that parties to the Treaty "undertake" not to place in orbit, nor
install on celestial bodies, nor station in outer space any nuclear arm-
aments or other weapons of mass destruction.57 This article, then, takes
the Test-Ban one step farther. An intentional omission, however, creates
a basic flaw as to the banning of such weapons from space: to constitute
a violation of the law they must be orbited or stationed in space. There
is no prohibition of manufacture of such devices, nor is there a ban of
missiles and bombs which achieve only a partial orbit; such weapons,
known as a Fractional Orbiting Bombing System (FOBS), are difficult
to detect by radar, and drop into their target zone almost vertically.
There is little defense against them. The Soviet Union has reportedly
developed such a system; the U.S. is understood to be developing the
Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), or the "Space Bus,"
which would be capable of achieving full orbit status. Thus, it would
appear that Article IV alone is inadequate to insure that space will
never be used for aggression.
Article IV also prohibits the testing of weapons of any kind or the
establishment of military bases on the celestial bodies. It allows the use
of "any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration" of
54 9 P.CJJ. Rep. 102, 141.
55 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 312.
56 Id. at 165.
57 UNGA Res. 1884 (XVIII), supra n. 39.
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celestial bodies. Whether this would allow the explosion of a nuclear
"device" on the surface of the moon for scientific purposes, as was re-
cently proposed,5 s is unclear. However, the intent of the international
community was very clear prior to adoption of the Treaty, that any
destructive nuclear device was unwelcome in space. Our own definition
of "weapon" as an "instrument designed to inflict injury upon an
enemy," 59 does not readily clarify the matter, but it is clear that even a
scientific nuclear bomb is capable of destructive use. Thus, despite
possible advantages to be gained from their use, nuclear devices should
not be employed at all in scientific exploration.
Article V gives astronauts the status of envoys of mankind and de-
mands that States' parties shall render all possible aid in the event of
accident or emergency landing in the territory of another Party or on
the high seas. It also declares that the astronauts of one State Party
shall give all possible assistance to the astronauts of another nation.60
The effect is uncertain whether, if it should be technically possible, one
Party would be obligated to launch a rescue craft to astronauts of an-
other State stranded in space. Such a coincidence of circumstances is
highly unlikely, but should it happen, it is possible that the pressure of
world opinion and humanitarian feelings might force the nation in such
a position to at least try to effectuate a rescue. The nonexistence of
suitable rescue techniques probably would prohibit such a rescue at this
time. The later Treaty on the Rescue of Astronauts did not expressly
deal with this point.
61
Astronauts and States are also instructed by Article V to report to
the United Nations any phenomena they discover which could constitute
a danger to the life of astronauts, in order to insure the widest possible
dissemination of such information and see that potentially affected na-
tions take all appropriate precautions. Together with Article XI, this is
the only responsibility the U.N. has towards conduct in outer space.
Responsibility for spatial activities is set out by Article VI. States
Parties are responsible internationally for their own actions, whether
such activities are carried on by governmental or private organizations.
62
If an international organization is conducting the activity, then both the
organization and its member States are responsible. If a private entity,
such as the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), is carry-
ing on the activity anywhere in space, then it is required to submit to
authorization and continuing supervision by its own government.
58 The San Francisco Chronicle (November 14, 1969).
59 See 44 Words and Phrases 763 (1962). Nuclear weapons are not specifically
discussed.
60 Berger, Space Vehicle And Astronaut Assistance And Liability For Damage, 8th
Colloquium on Law of Outer Space (1965).
61 April 22, 1968.
62 The U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is studying more construc-
tive proposals concerning Art. VI under UNGA Resolution No. 2222 (XXI) (1966).
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A section which is important, especially to the non-spacefaring na-
tions, is Article VII, which declares that States which procure the
launching of, and States from whose facilities or territory is launched,
an object into outer space, shall be jointly liable for damage caused to
other nations by such an object, whether on earth, in the air space, or in
outer space. This is a very real problem, as evidenced by the disastrous
potentialities of a faulty launching, and the documented reports of dam-
age due to the return of satellite components to earth. 3
A pol-UtdU dispute exists as to 0-le .....erpreatuzi.. V1 uil-- L.. -L'-
The primary problem revolves around the question of absolute liability
without fault and whether damages should be limited or not. Procedural
matters of determining liability and method of recovery are also being
argued. The Treaty itself provides no definitions or remedies. It has
been proposed that international law as set out in the Rome Convention
on "Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Sur-
face" should govern spacecraft also. 5 That agreement established abso-
lute but usually limited liability without fault and usually irrespective
of the actual cause. This proposal has merit; considering the even
greater hazards of spaceflight, the standards of care should certainly not
be relaxed.66
Article VIII declares that the State of registry retains jurisdiction
and control over objects and personnel launched into space, including
those installed on celestial bodies. Such objects, when they return to
earth in the territory of another Party, are to be returned to the State
of registry after identification. While the article seems innocent enough
on its face, it actually introduces an element of sovereignty into space.
67
"Jurisdiction" and "control" seem like perfectly natural concepts of
order in space, but the fact remains that an object installed on a celestial
body and retained in the jurisdiction of the launching State appropriates
de facto at least the soil upon which it rests. A kind of jus primis
occupantis,6 8 the first boundary in space, is established.6 9 To obviate this,
Prof. Matte proposes a jurisdiction of protection to be verified by the
international community, perhaps under the U.N., which could deal with
the registration of the vehicle at the same time.
70
Much concern has been expressed over the recent moon flights and
63 Christol, op. cit. supra n. 23 at 353; Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 339.
64 Matte, Id. at 345.
65 Convention On Damage Caused By Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties On the Sur-
face, supra n. 19.
66 Caplan, Law for Space Activities; Practical Proposals for a Comprehensive Con-
vention, 8th Colloquium on Law of Outer Space (1965).
67 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 336.
68 Id. at 313.
69 Cooper, Who Will Own the Moon? The Need for an Answer, 32 J. of Air Law
and Comm. 165 (1966).
70 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 313.
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the possibility of contamination from space.71 Article IX attempts to
deal with this problem by directing the Parties to conduct explorations
"so as to avoid ... harmful contamination and . . . harmful changes in
the environment of earth." States are to adopt "appropriate measures"
for that purpose. If another State Party fears that such measures are
insufficient it may request a consultation with the launching State, but
beyond this no steps are taken by the Treaty to insure that precautions
are taken. The goodwill of the launching nation is all that really gov-
erns such activities, and perhaps their desire (or lack of same) to spend
vast sums of money to achieve such purposes.
Article X, requiring international cooperation for observation and
tracking of space flights, appears to be innocuous, but, in fact, it was one
of the more difficult agreements to reach.7 2 It states that any Party shall
consider on the basis of equality a request by a launching nation to be
afforded an opportunity to observe its own flights from the former's
territory, the nature of such "opportunity" to be determined by agree-
ment between the parties. The U.S.S.R., in negotiation of the treaty,
demanded a clause requiring rights to be granted on the basis of the
most favored nation, which of course would entitle that nation to
observation bases in all those nations which have allowed U.S. bases,
and even in the U.S. if it granted such rights to another nation. The
United States resisted such a proposition vigorously, declaring that
observation rights are granted on the basis of reciprocal advantage and
bilateral agreement. The U.S.S.R. is benefited by the fact that the clause
is included in the Treaty at all, but it represents a victory for the U.S.
in its final form, since such opportunities remain subject to the will of
the host State.
3
The United Nations, which has been purposely excluded from oper-
ation of the Treaty, is thrown a pittance of responsibility by Article XI,
which agrees that information concerning space flights shall be furnished
to the Secretary-General, who is obliged to distribute it to the fullest
extent possible. Such information would be voluntary, however, on the
part of the launching State, so this section is actually a mere repetition
of the provisos of some U.N. resolutions as to the principles of voluntary
cooperation.
74
Article XII goes part way to mitigate the adverse effects of Article
VIII as to the control of objects on the moon and celestial bodies, al-
though in some ways it compounds the problem. The Article declares
that the outer space facilities of a State Party shall be open to free
71 i.e. See Berrill, Our Gamble in Space: The Search for Life, 212 Atlantic No. 35
(Aug. 1963).
72 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 315.
73 Dowling and Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. of Air Law
and Comm. 430, 442 (1967).
74 Id. at 445.
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access by other States on the basis of reciprocity-a provision patterned
after the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. However, the visiting state must
give prior notification to insure "maximum precautions" for safety and
avoidance of interference with normal operations at the site.75 The basis
of reciprocity is elusive: does this mean that the visiting state must have
the same type of installation, or the same number as it desires to visit?
The measure was adopted in part to effect some sort of international
control over the activities of States on the moon, but such verification
of use would seem to be illusory since the visited state may request
"consultations" before such a visit may take place, thus allowing any
illicit activity to be hidden.76
Article XIII declares that the provisions of the Treaty shall apply to
all activities in space, including those undertaken by international or
intergovernmental organizations.7 7 It directs that any practical questions
arising from such international activities are to be resolved by negoti-
ation either with the organization itself or with nation members of that
group. This article, however, does not obviate the responsibility placed
on individual nations by Article VI, nor can it place responsibility on
States, members of the organization in question, which are not parties
to the Treaty.
What is the total effect of the Outer Space Treaty? It has been
severely criticized from several sides as weak, inadequate, ambiguous,
and anthropocentric.78 It was conceived by the two major space powers
in what some regard merely as a cynical desire to avoid a new arms race
in space. Its unique method of signing was intended to give the fullest
possible semblance of international cooperation, even though the pros-
pects for true internalization of space are exceedingly dim at this time.
Despite these facts, it cannot be said that the Treaty is not an im-
portant document in international law. The mere fact that it does help
prevent a spatial arms race makes it invaluable, whatever the motives
behind it. The fact that it is a declaration of principles sets it apart from
most treaties and will allow development of more complex law within
the context and realities of space, as knowledge of that area increases.
Most important, it sets a direction for mankind, condemning all military
activity and encouraging only peaceful activity. Cynics may point to
vacuous promises and broken treaties, but the powerful nations of the
world, despite all indications to the contrary, are not blind: aggressive
competition in space could only lead to disaster; cooperation, on the
other hand, could reveal benefits unthought of in this age.
75 See Vlasic, The Space Treaty; a Preliminary Evaluation, 55 Cal. L. R. 515 (1967).
76 Cooper, Some Crucial Questions About the Space Treaty, Air Force and Space
Digest 107 (Mar. 1967).
77 This Article should be read in conjunction with Art. VI.
78 Matte, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 319.
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